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COMMENTS
Removal of Obstructions from Navigable Waters: Shipowners'
Liability and the Wreck Act
I.

INTRODUCTION

The history of the rivers and harbors found in the United States
reveals their vulnerability to obstruction by refuse, soil deposits, manmade structures, and the discards of navigation-abandoned shipwrecks.
As do the roads and rails that connect centers of population and commerce,
these rivers and harbors play the role of "highways"' of commerce, and
the public interest demands that they be kept free of obstruction. Obstructions occur even through normal use by shipping. In addition, there is
the problem caused by the careless discharge of waste and industrial
residue. In Gibbons v. Ogden,' the Supreme Court found the commerce
clause of the Constitution sufficient authority to give Congress regulatory
power over navigable rivers. Congress has exercised that authority by
various regulatory statutes4 in an effort to give the executive branch
sufficient power to keep those rivers and harbors free of hazards to
navigation.
There has been from the days of the Magna Charta5 a recognition of
'Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91 (1838); People
v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138, 147, 4 P. 1152, 1155 (1884).
A vast inland waterway .. .is a national highway in which all the
people have an interest. It is a national asset.... The national character
of this natural resource gives the Government an essential federal interest
in it as a national artery of commerce.
United States v. Cargill, Inc., 367 F.2d 971, 978 (5th Cir. 1966).
222 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See also Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3
Wall.) 713 (1865).
'U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 8.
"The principle legislation in the field is the Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3,
1899, 30 Stat. 1121, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§401-466(k) (1964). See notes 2024 infra.
,Clause 33 of the Magna Charta provided for the removal of "kydells, or weirs,
from the Thames and the Medway and throughout all England except the seacoasts, so as to clear the streams for the free passage of both people and fish." 25
Edw. 3, c. 4 (1350) as quoted in Stone, Public Rights in Water Uses and Private
Rights in Land Adjacent to Water, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 181 (R.
Clark ed. 1967).
Early maritime codes reflected the industry's concern over such obstructions
causing hazards to shipping.
Item, left inquiry be made of all those whoe doe in the great streames and
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the interest of the public in keeping navigable rivers open to traffic and
commerce. Those causing obstructions were generally forced to pay
damages to injured parties if the obstruction could be classified as a
"public nuisance" under the common law,' although removal was sometimes ordered by injunction. 7
Unlike other obstructions to navigation, abandoned wrecks have
historically presented a special problem. It would seem logical that a
shipowner should bear the financial responsibility for damages caused
by his wrecked vessel or for removal expenses should it cause a hinderance
to traffic upon a river. However, the general maritime law has by tradition allowed a shipowner to escape all liability caused by his ship if he
abandons his vessel.'
The theory of the law was that if the sunken vessel is a menace to
to navigation its disposition is a matter of public concern, and that the
owner has suffered sufficient loss in the loss of the craft and no
further loss will be imposed upon him by way of damages for subsequent accident, provided always that he has abandoned it. 9
channells of the havens or ports keepe upp weres, kiddies, blindestakes,
watermills, or other instruments, to the annoyance of ports, whereby ships
or boates have been lost or man killed.
XXVI INQUIsITION TAKEN AT QUEENBORO

ADnRALTY,

(13,75)

in THE BLACK BOOK

OF THE

55 RERUm BRiTANNIcAmUm MEDIi .MVII SCRIPTORES (CHRONICLES

AND MEMORIALS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND DURING THE MIDDLE

AGES) 153

(1965).
'See, e.g., Woodman v. Kilbourn Mfg. Co., 30 F. Cas. 503 (No. 17,978)
(C.C. Wis. 1867); People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138, 4 P.
1152 (1884); Boston & Hingham Steamboat Co. v. Munson, 117 Mass. 34 (1875);
Board of Water Comm'rs v. Detroit, 117 Mich. 458, 76 N.W. 70 (1898) ; Viebaln
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 96 Minn. 276, 104 N.W. 1089 (1905).
'See, e.g., United States v. Duluth, 25 F. Cas. 923 (No. 15,001) (C.C. Minn.
(5 Gilm.) 351 (1848); People v. Vanderbilt,
1871); People v. St. Louis, 10 Ill.

26 N.Y. 287 (1863). See also Attorney-General v. Forbes, 40 Eng. Rep. 587 (Ch.
Attorney-General v. Johnson, 37 Eng. Rep. 240 (Ch. 1819).
1836);
8 See The South Shore, 35 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1929); Winpenny v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 135, 139 (1871). See also White v. Crisp, 156 Eng. Rep. 463

(Ex. 1854). What acts constitute an abandonment of a vessel depends, in large
part, upon the circumstances involved. But there are general standards interpreted
in the light of those circumstances that have to be met. See The Port Hunter, 6
F. Supp. 1009 (D. Mass. 1934); Gulf Coast Transp. Co. v. Ruddock-Orleans Cypress Co., 17 F.2d 858 (E.D. La. 1927).
'The Manhattan, 10 F. Supp. 45, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1935), aff'd 85 F.2d 427 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied sub itm., United States v. The Bessemer, 300 U.S. 654
(1936). See also The King v. Watts, 170 Eng. Rep. 493 (Assizes 1798). But
see Board of Water Comm'rs v. Detroit, 117 Mich. 458, 76 N.W. 70 (1898). The
basis for the argument protecting the small shipowner has been challenged today
as without merit since single boat incorporation and insurance are both available as
alternative methods of financial protection. Morreale, The Federal Wreck Act and
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By taking advantage of the privilege of abandonment, shipowners
were able to escape common law liability for their obstructions. Thus
they stood in a preferred position among those who through their enterprise, caused obstruction to navigation. Reflecting the conflict at the turn
of the century, the court deciding Missouri River Packet Co. v. Hannibal
&' St. T. R.R. 10 summarized the existing law.
Those navigating the river are under no obligation to remove
wrecks which may be made in the ordinary and proper course of
navigation . .. [ilt is also the law that he who, for his own benefit,
and not for the purpose of navigation or commerce, uses any navigable
part of d river, is liable in damages to the party injured if such use
...increases the difficulty and danger of navigation, and injury results
therefrom.'Whether the courts were allowing a rightful subsidy to the shipping industry is,, of course, a point of conjecture. 12 But the fact remained that
for shipping, abandonment precluded liability for subsequent injury to
navigation.
If a shipowner could thereby shield himself from liability to the users
of these navigable waters, could he be forced to remove his sunken wreck
'from the river? Before Congress enacted appropriate legislation, state
,courts (and federal courts following the state law) managed to exercise
some authority over those who blocked navigable waterways.' 8 But
beginning in 1880, congressional pre-emption", placed the bulk of the
responsibility in the hands of the federal courts. While recognizing the
,clear congressional prerogative to regulate the navigation of rivers among
the M.drithite Industry: An Archaic Subsidy, 21
. (1967).
102

RUTGERS

L. Rav. 478, 487-88

F. 285 (W.D. Mo. 1880).

"Id. at 292.

IEn relation to abandonment under the Rivers and Harbors Act, note 4 supra,
see Morreale, supra note 9. This point has also been made with reference to
statutory limitation discussed in notes 112-13 and accompanying text infra. Comment, Shipowmers' Limited Liability, 3 CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PRoD. 105, 112-13
(1967).
8 See, e.g., Piscataqua Nay. Co. v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 89 F. 362 (D.
Mass. 1898); Omslaer v. Philadelphia Co., 31 F. 354 (W.D. Pa. 1887); Ball v.
Berwind, 29 F. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1886); DeBardeleben Coal Co. v. Cox, 16 Ala.
App. 172, 76 So. 409 (1917); Board of Water Comm'rs v. Detroit, 117 Mich. 458,
76 N.W. 70 (1898).
"'Aseries of acts relating to obstructions to navigable waters was passed by
Congress, the first of these being the River and Harbor Act of June 14, 1880,
21 Stat. 180. Concerning pre-emption of the area by the federal government, see
United States v. Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co., 3 F. 548 (C.C. Minn. 1880).
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the several states under the commerce clause, the Supreme Court in
Willametta Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch5 refused to allow the federal
judiciary to impose liability for the removal of any obstructions by virtue
of any federal common-law right.
The power of Congress to pass laws for the regulation of the navigation of public rivers, and to prevent any and all obstructions therein,
is not questioned. But until it does pass some such law, there is no
common law of the United States which prohibits obstructions and
nuisances in navigable rivers, unless it be maritime law . . .. No
precedent, however, exists for the enforcement of any such law .... 16
The language of Hatch limited relief for removal liability to that
given by statute despite some earlier indications from the Court that it
would allow equitable relief in the proper circumstances? Even though
the strictness of the language its emphatic, Hatch has been mollified
somewhat by subsequent decisions."8 The case, however, stands for the
proposition that relief must come by way of statute.' 9
2°
II. THrE WREcx STAT.UTO

Using its power to regulate commerce, Congress did enact a series
of laws to provide statutory authority for federal action to keep rivers
and harbors free from obstructions to navigation. 2' The most significant
of these is the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.2 This Act at its passage
28
was purportedly a codification of the law as it existed at that time
" 125 U.S. 1 (1888).
- Id. at 8. See generally Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. Rv.
1512 (1969) ; Comment, Swift v. Tyson Exhumed, 79 YALE L.J. 284 (1969).
'See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.)
518 (1851). See also United States v. Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co., 3 F.
548 (C.C. Minn. 1880); United States v. Duluth, 25 F. Cas. 923 (No. 15,001)
(C.C. Minn. 1871).
18 See Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1924).
19
The history of federal control over obstructions to the navigable capacity
of our rivers and harbors goes back to Willametta;Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch
where the court held "there is no common law of the United States"
which prohibits "obstructions" in our navigable rivers.
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 485-86 (1960). See Morreale,
supra note 9, at 486.
"A short-hand phrase referring to that part of the Rivers and Harbors Act
dealing with shipping. 33 U.S.C. §§ 409, 414-15 (1964).
:' River and Harbor Act of June 14, 1880, ch. 180, 21 Stat. 180; River. and
Harbor Act of 1890, ch. 907, 26 Stat. 426; Rivers and Harbors Act of -1899, 30
Stat. 1121, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-466(k) (1964).
30 Stat. 1121, as amended, 3a U.S.C. §§ 401-466(k) (1964).
2532 CONG. Rac. 2923 (1899).
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and stands today as the principle statutory "scheme" 24 for dealing with
obstructions to navigation upon the nation's rivers.
Section 10 of the Act 5 prohibits "[t]he creation of any obstruction
not affirmatively authorized by Congress." In addition to obstructions,
that section also prohibits the creation of "structures" such as wharves,
piers, booms, etc., that would occlude navigable waters. Criminal penalties
for violating section 10 are found in section 12 of the Act." That section
also gives the courts power to issue injunctions providing for removal of
"structures" erected in violation of section 10.Y The failure of Congress
to provide for injunctions ordering removal of all obstructions, instead
of limiting injunctive power to removal of "structures," became signfiicant
in later years. 28
Conspicuously, shipping is treated separately from other obstructions.
Section 15 of the Act2 9 prohibits the intentional or careless sinking of
vessels in navigable waters, and places the responsibility for marking the
wreck on the owner.
It shall not be lawful ... to voluntarily or carelessly sink, or permit or
cause to be sunk, vessels or other craft in navigable channels ....
And whenever a vessel, raft, or other craft is wrecked and sunk in a
2,Ray, The Removal of Obstructions from Navigable Waters-Who Pays?,
34 INs. COUNSEL J. 28, 29 (1967).
" The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress
to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of
any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other
structures in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or
other water of the United States, outside established harbor lines, or where
no harbor lines have been established, except on plans recommended by
the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army; and
it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner alter or modify
the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven,
harbor, canal, lake, harbor or refuge, or inclosure within the limits of any
breakwater, or of the channel of any navigable water of the United States,
unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and
authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same.
33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964).
21 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1964).
2 [T]he removal of any structures or part of structures erected in violation
of the provisions of the said section may be enforced by the injunction of
any district court exercising jurisdiction in any district in which said
structures may exist ....

§ 406 (1964).
33 U.S.C.
2
1See
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); United
235 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1956).
States v. Wilson,§409
(1964).
29 33 U.S.C.
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navigable channel, accidentally or otherwise, it shall be the duty of
the owner of such sunken craft to immediately mark it . . . until
the sunken craft is removed or abandoned.30
The Act creates an affirmative duty on the part of the owner either to
remove the wreck or to abandon it for removal by the government.
[A]nd it shall be the duty of the owner of such sunken craft to
commence the immediate removal of the same, and prosecute such
removal diligently, and failure to do so shall be considered as an
abandonment of such craft, and subject the same to removal by the
United States .... sx
It is important to note that section 15 makes negligent or intentional
sinking of a vessel unlawful, but this section does not prescribe any
absolute duty to remove upon the owner. That duty is phrased in the
alternative, for instead of removal, the owner may abandon his vessel.
This option appears very similar to the maritime right of abandonment
discussed earlier22' Several courts inferred from the option that Congress
intended to preserve the privilege of abandonment when it enacted the
statute. 3
There is, then, no affirmative statutory duty to remove a wreck that
has become an obstruction to navigation once the owner abandons his
vessel even though the intentional or negligent sinking of such vessel is
labeled as "unlawful." There are penalties listed in section 16 of the
Act 4 for the violation of section 15, but their application is limited to
pilots and masters and does not apply to owners.
The contention that the Rivers and Harbors Act did not change the
traditional maritime privilege of abandonment was strengthened further
by the remedial provisions found in section 1 9 ."a It provides that upon
30 Id.

"Id.
See p. 553-54 supra. See also In re Highland Navigation Corp., 24 F.2d 582,
584 (S.D.N.Y. 1927).
" See, e.g., United States v. Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 374 F.2d 656, 667-68
(4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 319 F.2d 512, 521-22
(9th Cir. 1963); The Manhattan, 10 F. Supp. 45, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1935).
"133 U.S.C. §412 (1964).
"33 U.S.C. §414 (1964)
So far as I know the right of recoupment against a tortfeasor who causes
a sinking has never been asserted by the government in case the wreck
was privately owned, and I can find nothing in the statute which creates
such a right ....
In fact, the rights in rem which are conferred would
seem to negative that intent.
The Manhattan, 10 F. Supp. 45, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1935).
11
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abandonment of the vessel by the owner, the Secretary of the Army is
authorized to remove the vessel and to use the sale proceeds from the
salvaged wreck to set off expenses incurred. There is thus an affirmative
legislative remedy given in case of abandonment by the owner. Not only
does that provision provide for removal by the government, but also
states a method of reimbursement to the government for its expenses, i.e.
to proceed in rem against the wreck itself.
The lack of explicit wording evidencing an intent by Congress either
to exonerate shipowners abandoning their vessels or, conversely, to hold
them liable in personam for removal expenses through remedies available
outside the Act (or implicit within its provisions) has provided the
principle difficulty."' It will be remembered that in the midst of the
formative era of federal statutory regulations concerning obstructions to
navigation, the Supreme Court in Hatch refused to find any federal
common law or maritime law that would, in the absence of statute,
87
compel anyone to remove obstacles that endangered navigation.
When vessels were sunk by accident, and without negligence on the
part of the owner or master, the courts have seemed very willing to
allow the owner to escape liability by abandonment. This situation, in
fact, seems to fit all the equities and justifications previously set forth 8
for allowing abandoning owners to escape in personam liability under
the general maritime law; i.e., the owner who has lost his vessel without
fault on his part should not be forced to remove it and thereby incur an
even greater loss. The courts have found no evidence that the Act would
demand a contrary result in such a situation. 89
"aSee United States v. Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 374 F.2d 656 (4th Cir.

1967); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 3,19 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1963);
United States v. Zubik, 295 F.2d 53, 56-57 (3d Cir. 1961); The Manhattan, 10 F.
Supp. 45, 49-50 (E.D. Pa. 1935); United States v. Bridgeport Towing Line, Inc.,
15 F.2d 240 (D. Conn. 1926). See generally Morreale, supra note 9, at 481.
8
" United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 319 F.2d 512, 519-20 (9th Cir. 1963).
See p. 555 supra.

*"See note 9 & accompanying text supra.
"See, e.g., The Demand, 174 F. Supp. 668 (D. Mass. 1959) ; In re Highland

Nay. Corp., 24 F.2d 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1927).
It is well settled that a shipowner whose vessel has been wrecked and
sunk without his fault has a right to abandon it, and that after abandonment
he is not under any obligation whatsoever to raise or remove it, and is not
personally liable for the expense of removal. This is so, though an act
of Congress . . . authorizes the secretary of War to remove obstructions

to navigation, and provides that expense shall be charged upon the vessel
raised by the government ...

. The exemption from liability after aban-

donment arises under general maritime law.
Id. at 584.
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However, an intentional sinking by the owner does not seem to possess
the requisite equities that apparently are evident in the case of an accidental sinking. Not only is the act willful, but it causes the government
the expense of removal under section 19 of the Act.4" In United States
v. Hall,4" the government sought an injunction for the removal of a vessel
intentionally sunk in Rockland Harbor on the Maine coast. At the time
of the action, the River and Harbor Act of 189042 was the most recent
legislation in force dealing with removal-liability. Section 10 of that Act
provided injunctive relief for the removal of all obstructions. (It will
be remembered that the successor to section 10 of the Act of 1890, section 12 of the Act of 1899, limits the injunctive relief to removal of those
obstructions classified as "structures.") ' The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit noted that obstructions in navigable rivers were considered
nuisances at common law, but recognized the right of shipowners under
general maritime law to abandon their vessels to escape liability for
obstruction." However, the court limited the privilege of abandonment
to those cases in which there was "inevitable accident or misfortune. ...
Since a vessel sunk on purpose by the owner was not one lost due to
inevitable accident or misfortune, the court held that the privilege of
abandonment would not be granted and that the vessel, instead, would
be classified as an obstruction subject to removal under section 10 of
the Act of 1890.
[I]t follows from this construction that hulls of vessels sunk in
harbors not through perils of the sea, but by voluntary act of owners
or their authorized agents, are obstructions, within the meaning of
this section of the statute.46
Although there was subsequent disagreement as to whether section 12
of the Act of 1899 repealed section 10 of the Act of 1890, 47 Hall was

continually cited as authority for finding that abandonment could not
shield the owner from responsibility of removal if the vessel had been sunk
intentionally.4 8
'033 U.S.C. § 414 (1964). See p. 557 supra.
" 63 F. 472 (1st Cir. 1894).

' 26 Stat. 426.
,8 See note 27 supra.

"63 F. at 474.

'0 Id.
"0Id. at 475.
' See note 28 & accompanying text supra.
"See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 235 F. Supp. 569 (D. Md.
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Courts after Hall, however, were reluctant to extend its holding beyond
cases of intentional sinking despite the broad language of the decision.4 9
Therefore, owners of vessels sunk by negligence were not compelled to
remove or to pay the cost of removal. The government found itself
compelled to remove the wreck under section 19 or 20 of the Act of 1899,61
but was unable through any part of the Act either to demand that the
negligent owner remove at his own expense or to recoup expenses incurred in its own removal operations51 beyond earnings from the sale
of the salvaged vessel.
Since the Act provided an in rem right against the abandoned wreck,
many courts refused to find any Congressional intent to provide further
relief in personam against the owner.52 That section 15 of the Act seems
to preserve the privilege of abandonment by framing the shipowner's
duty in the alternative added weight to the contention, 3 despite the
language of earlier cases limiting the traditional maritime abandoment
privilege supposedly adopted by the Act to "accidental" sinkings, 4 i.e.
to those in which the owner was not at fault.
There were, of course, instances in which the government recovered
most of its costs by the sale of the removed vessel under authority
granted in section 19 of the Act." But in several instances the costs of
removal were disaproportionate to the amount realized on the sale."0
1964) ; In re Eastern Transp. Co., 102 F. Supp. 913 (D. Md. 1952) ; United States

v. Bridgeport Towing Line, Inc., 15 F.2d 240 (D. Conn. 1926).
9
See, e.g., United States v. Bridgeport Towing Line, Inc., 15 F.2d 240, 241

(D. Conn. 1926).
" See note 35 supra.
" See, e.g., United States v. Zubik, 295 F.2d 53, 56 (3d Cir. 1961); Loud v.
United States, 286 F. 56 (6th Cir. 1923); The Manhattan, 10 F. Supp. 45, 50
(E.D. Pa. 1935).
"2 See China Union Lines, Ltd. v. A. 0. Andersen & Co., 364 F.2d 769, 792
(5th Cir. 1966); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 319 F.2d 512, 520 (9th
Cir. 1963); United States v. Zubik, 295 F.2d 53, 57 (3d Cir. 1961); Loud v.
United States, 286 F. 56, 59 (6th Cir. 1923); The Manhattan, 10 F. Supp. 45,
49 (E.D. Pa. 1935).
"' See, United States v. Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 374 F.2d 656, 667-68
(4th Cir. 1967) ; In re Highland Navigation Corp., 29 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1928).
But see In re Eastern Transp. Co., 102 F. Supp. 913, 917 (D. Md. 1952).
5'See, e.g., Winpenny v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 135 (1871).
"5See, e.g., China Union Lines, Ltd. v. A. 0. Andersen & Co., 364 F.2d 769
(5th Cir. 1966); Zubik v. United States, 190 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1951); The Manhattan, 10 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Pa. 1935).
" United States v. Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 374 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1967)
(163,000 dollars for removal); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 319 F.2d
512 (9th Cir. 1963) (336,000 dollars); United States v. Zubik, 295 F.2d 53 (3d Cir.

19701

OBSTRUCTIONS IN NAVIGABLE WATERS

When the loss was occasioned by the negligence of the owner, the inability of the government to hold the owner responsible for its costs of
removal proved inequitable to say the least.
Beginning in 1960, the Supreme Court began to evidence a change in
attitude toward the heretofore narrow interpretation of the Rivers and
Harbors Act. In United States v. Republic Steel Corp.5 7 the government
sought an injunction for violation of section 10 of the Act of 1899 to prohibit the deposit of industrial waste in the Calumet River, which flows out
of Lake Michigan. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Douglas recognized that a literal reading of section 12 of the Act of 1899 gave injunctive
relief for the removal of "structures" only. 58 However, he felt compelled to
construe the problem in light of the purpose of the Act: to provide a
statutory scheme for keeping rivers and harbors free of obstructions.
Quoting language by Mr. Justice Holmes that "[a] river is more than
an amenity, it is a treasure," 9 he saw a frustration of the congressional
intent should the courts be limited to the injunctive power in section 12,
which applied solely to those obstructions that could be classified as
structures. The logical result was to extend the injunctive power to other
obstacles made unlawful in section 10 despite the limiting language of
section 12.60
Republic Steel signaled a "fresh reappraisal"'" of the Rivers and
Harbors Act. Subseqeuent decisions relying on the opinion did not limit
the liberalized interpretation solely to section 10, but injected the precedent
into other sections of the Act as well. 2 There was even some evidence
that the reappraisal would spill over into the troublesome area of ship1951) (3,273,.83 dollars); In re Eastern Transp. Co., 102 F. Supp. 913 (D. Md.
1952) (6,000 dollars).
67362 U.S. 482 (1960).
Id. at 491.
= New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
60362 U.S. at 491-92. The Court relied heavily on Sanitary Dist. v. United
States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925), in which the Court had enjoined the diversion of
water flowing into Lake Michigan by interpreting the Act as "a broad expression
of policy in unmistakable terms." 266 U.S. at 429.
"1United States v. Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 374 F.2d 656, 667 (4th Cir.
1967).
".See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966) (discharge
of commercially valuable gasoline into a river violative of section 13 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act (33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964), which prohibited discharge of refuse
matter into navigable waters). See aZso United States v. Perma Paving Co.,
332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964); Lauritzen v. Chesapeake Bay Bridge & Tunnel
Dist., 259 F. Supp. 633 (E.D.. Va. 1966); United States v. New York Cent. R.R.,
252 F. Supp. 508 (D. Mass. 1965).
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owner liability for wreck removal. Judge Browning of the Ninth Circuit,
dissenting in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 3 felt that after
Republic Steel, sections 15 and 19 (dealing with sunken vessels)"1
should not be so narrowly construed as in the past. 5 Judge Sobeloff of
of the Fourth Circuit, dissenting in United States v. Moran Towing &
Transportation Co.,"0 could not "accept the view that Congress meant to
bestow a beneficence on careless owners by nullifying the statutorily
declared obligation of such persons to remove obstructions caused by
them."67 Although these voices of judicial dissent were given their due
respect, it took a near disaster to pave the way for the reassessment of
a negligent shipowner's liability to remove his sunken vessel from navigable waters.
III. UNITED STATES V.

2,200,000

POUNDS OF CHLORINE0

8

In March of 1961, a barge owned by Wyandotte Transportation Company, the Wychem 112, was loaded with 2,200,000 pounds of liquid
chlorine at Geismar, Louisiana. On March 23, while on its way up the
Mississippi River to South Charleston, West Virginia, the barge sank
near Vidalia, Louisiana. Unable to raise the barge, the owners notified
the Army Corps of Engineers "that it believed further efforts to raise
the barge would be unsuccessful" and that it was abandoning the
vessel.69 Government investigators were sent to the scene and determined
that there was a potential danger of leakage from the storage tanks of
liquid chlorine that remained intact at the bottom of the Missisippi River.
If a leakage occurred, the lives of local inhabitants would be endangered
0- 319 F.2d 512, 522 (9th Cir. 1963).
6133 U.S.C. §§ 409, 414 (1964). See pp. 557-58 supra.

"There is nothing in their language or purpose to suggest that Congress
intended Sections 414 and 415 [sections 19 and 20 of the Act] to affect in
any way the civil liability of a wrongdoer . . . who caused the wreck

in violation of section 409 [section 15].
319 F.2d at 524-25.
- 374 F.2d 656, 669 (4th Cir. 1967).
07 374 F.2d at 670.
But nowhere has Congress manifested such unrestrained benevolence towards owners so as to warrant the implication of immunity from responsibility for the negligent sinking of vessels. It is an unwarranted extension
of these policies for courts to dilute the clear congressional condemnation
in section 409 [section 15 of the Act] of carelessness causing obstructions to
navigation and the equally clear command to remove.
Id. at 672.
" Companion case to United States v. Cargill, Inc., 1964 A.M.C. 1742 (E.D.
La.) (the district court's decision was not officially reported).
0
'Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 194 (1967).
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by the lethal gas. At the request of the governors of Mississippi and
Louisiana,70 the President proclaimed the site a major disaster area so
that emergency federal relief could be made available. 1 Elaborate
safety precautions were taken to protect local inhabitants."2 After removal
of the barge and chlorine by the government (under removal provisions
found in section 19 of the Act of 1899), they were sold for $85,000.
This sum was hardly enough to compensate the government for its expenditures of $3,081,0007 for removal and safety measures.
The United States charged the owners with negligence and sought
reimbursement in personam for the expenses in excess of the amount
realized on the sale of the raised barge and chlorine. Full disclosure of
the particular facts was not made before the defendants moved to dismiss
the action. Citing prior cases holding that negligence was no bar to the
privilege of abandonment by shipowners, the court dismissed the government's charges.7 5 The Fifth Circuit, however, did not agree. Using
Republic Steel as a springboard, it found that abandonment by the negligent shipowner would not shield him from liability under the Rivers and
Harbors Act."' The reasoning of the court was remarkably similar to
that used in United States v. Hall 7 7 some 70 years earlier to find an intentionally sunk vessel an obstruction under the Act of 1892. The court
concluded that section 15 of the Act, which gave the owner the right
to abandon as an alternative to removal, applied only to owners of ships
sunk without fault.7 8 The court viewed a submerged wreck endangering
7o Ray, supra note 24, at 33.
7 The declaration was made pursuant to the Disaster Relief Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1855-1855g (1964). 389 U.S. at 195.
" 389 U.S. at 195. Approximately 2,000 federal troops were moved into the
area in case evacuation became necessary. In addition, 30,000 gas masks were
issued to the population in the vicinity of the wreck site. Ray, supra note 24,
at 33. The cost of these preventive measures was put at 1,516,000 dollars. 389 U.S.
at 196 n.4.
73 389 U.S. at 195 n.2.
71

Id. at 196 n.4.

"' This Court is unable to find any authority of any kind which would support the proposition that the Government, under these circumstances, has
a right to recover the cost of raising such vessels from the owners or
operators thereof. The jurisprudence is clear and unequivocal to the
effect that the only right in such a case that the United States Government
has to recover its expenses is a right in rem against the vessels themselves.
There is no right in personam against the owners of the vessels where
the owners of the vessels have abandoned them to the Government.
United States v. Cargill, 1964 A.M.C. 1742, 1743-44 (E.D. La.).
71 United States v. Cargill, Inc., 367 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1966).
7 63 F. 472 (1st Cir. 1894). See note 41 & accompanying text supra.
78

367 F.2d at 977-78.
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navigation as an obstruction to traffic just as much as a prohibited
structure or other occlusion in the river. The court found, therefore, that
the wreck was subject to removal under section 10 of the Act of 1899,
which prohibits obstructions."0 Republic Steel had widened the injunctive power in section 12 to cover removal of all obstructions made unlawful under section 10.80 Since the defendants had refused to remove the
Wychem 112, the court concluded that the government could recover
damages for its removal operations if Wyandotte was found negligent.
The case was remanded for a finding on the issue of negligence."'
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court in Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States,"' but used a different approach to the
problem of liability. Instead of finding the proper remedy in section 10
of the Act, as the circuit court had done, the Court held that the government was not limited to the remedies found in the Act and that if the
Act made a negligent sinking unlawful, the courts could look to proper
83
remedies even though they were not specified within the Act itself.

Given the purpose of the statutory scheme as interpreted in Republic
Steel, the Court argued that it could not have been the intent of Congress
to limit the remedies available to the government to those enumerated
since they are obviously inadequate to cope with sinkings caused by
negligence. "[0]ur reading of the Act does not lead us to the conclusion
that Congress must have intended the statutory remedies and procedures
to be exclusive of all others." 4 The Court concluded that the government
could proceed in personam on a negligence theory to enforce section 15
of the Act, which makes it unlawful to "voluntarily or carelessly sink"
a vessel in navigable waters covered by the Act. 5
" The history of the various acts demonstrates an intent of Congress to
provide a method of government removal of vessels, not to limit the
liability of those causing the sinking. It is illogical to conclude that a vessel
is not an obstruction solely because it is given separate treatment. Hall
bears this out.
Id. at 975.
" See note 57 & accompanying text supra.
8 Even though the remedy in section 12 of this Act is by way of injunction, the
court ordered damages for raising the Wychem 112. The actual removal costs
were not to be taken as conclusive proof of damages, but were to be used as evidence in that determination. 367 F.2d at 979.
82389 U.S. 191 (1967).

Is389 U.S. at 200-01. See generally Note, Implying Civil Remedies from

Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REv. 285 (1963).
84389 U.S. at 200.
" The Government may, in our view, seek an order that a negligent party
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The difference in the approach to shipowners' liability in the Supreme
Court's decision and that of the circuit court is significant. It must be
admitted that a careful reading of the Act does not support a finding
that would classify negligentIy-sunken ships under section 10 when they
are specifically covered in section 15. The circuit court was obviously influenced by the interpretation in Republic Steel of section 10,11 and no
doubt the lack of precedent for finding liability outside the statute due to
the holding in Hatch gave added impetus to the finding of liability within
some section of the Act. If liability was to be placed on the shipowner in
Wyandotte (and the equities of the situation seemed to compel such a
finding), the means appatently had to come from within the statute. It
was a logical step from Republic Steel to hold that a vessel obstructing
navigable rivers due to negligence was an obstruction just as any other
navigational hazard.
But the Supreme Court chose the alternate course by finding remedies
independent of the statute to enforce the provisions within it. Whether
Wyandotte will be taken as a sub silentio repudiation of Hatch's prohibition of indepndent remedies is unclearsT The conflict with Hatch was
not discussed in the Court's opinion. Instead, the holding centered
around the intent of the framers of the Rivers and Harbors Act. The
illegality of sinkings caused by negligence under section 15 was crucial.
The Court reasoned that Congress could not have intended to make
sinking due to negligence illegal without some means of recovering
compensation from those who violated the prohibition."8
Some members of Congress"" have viewed the courts' dilemma sympathetically. The response has been a proposed amendment to the Rivers
and Harbors Act to expressly charge negligent owners with liability for
is responsible for rectifying the wrong done to maritime commerce by a
§ 15 violation. Denial of such a remedy to the United States would permit
the result, extraordinary in our jurisprudence, of a wrongdoer shifting
responsibility for the consequences of his negligence onto his victims ....
We do not believe that Congress intended to withhold from the Government
a remedy that ensures the full effectiveness of the Act.
389 U.S. at 204.
:' See note 60 & accompanying text sapra.
87 See p. 555 supra.
88 "We therefore hold that the remedies and procedures specified by the Act
for the enforcement of § 15 were not intended to be exclusive." 389 U.S. at 200-01.
80
Representative John S. Monagan has sponsored an amendment to section 16
of the Rivers and Harbors Act since the 88th Congress. The first proposed amendment was t.R. 12374, reintroduced in the 90th Congress as H.R. 1059a. The bill
has since been introduced again.
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removal expenses (and for other damaging side effects of sinkings). The
amendment would add the following language to section 16 of the Act.
(b) Any person (i) who violates section 10, 11, 13, or 15 of this
Act, or (ii) who is the owner of any boat, ship, vessel, barge, raft, or
other watercraft or other similar obstruction which is subject to
removal or destruction under
(iii) who is the owner of any
liable to the United States . .
curred . . . in removing the

section 19 or 20 of this Act . . . or
cargo on any such [craft] ... shall be
. for all reasonably necessary costs inobstruction . . . Provided, however,

That such violation, obstruction, sinking, or grounding (1) resulted
from such person's violation of the aforesaid sections of this Act
or from his willful act or negligence, and also (2) resulted in impeding or endangering navigation . . . [and] any amounts covered

into the Treasury of the United States under section 19 or 20 of
this Act ... shall be set off against any reimbursement .... 00
The amendment would, in effect, give statutory sanction to the
decision in Wyandotte. Moreover, it would expand the class of those
subject to removal-liability to include cargo-owners. How useful such
an inclusion would be depends upon how much responsibility the cargoowner can be said to have over the actual movement of his cargo.
IV.

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

When negligence was discussed previously in the context of shipowner's removal-liability, the question of whose negligence, or what types
of negligent acts, would raise such liability was not put to test. Of course,
negligence by the master or pilot subjects him to penalties under section
16 of the Act. 1 The fact that negligence was not otherwise a basis for
liability until Wyandotte forestalled any real consideration of what types
of conduct would be required for the owner to be classified as a "negligent"
owner rather than an "innocent" one.
Even though Wyandotte has cleared the way for actions in negligence
against shipowners, another barrier still has not beeen clearly defined:
Can a shipowner claim the privilege of limitation of liability to place a
ceiling on his liability for removal costs ?2 Before Wyandotte, owners who
" H.R. 10593, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).

U.S.C. § 412 (1964). See note 34 & accompanying text supra.
general, the privilege allows the shipowner to surrender his vessel or its
value to a competent court. There is then a pro rata distribution of the funds from
9133

92In

19701

OBSTRUCTIONS IN NAVIGABLE WATERS

found themselves charged by the government for removal expenses often
petitioned for limitation of their liability to the value of the vessel after
the sinking as an alternative defense to the right of abandonment under
the Rivers and Harbors Act.9 3 But the issue was never reached because
abandonment was held to preclude liability. Wyandotte, of course, has
changed that result.
The concept of limitation of liability is deeply rooted in general maritime law.14 The privilege of limitation was adopted by statute in this
country in the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851." This Act allows
the shipowner's liability for damages occasioned by fault in the operation
of his vessel to be limited to his interest in the vessel and the pending
freight 0 if the loss was caused without his "privity or knowledge." 97
The liability of the owner of any vessel . . . for any loss, damage,

or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage,
or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or
knowledge of such owner or owners, shall not [except in cases of
personal injury] . .

.

exceed the amount or value of the interest of

98
such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending

the vessel, but there is no further liability against the owner even if the value
of the vessel is insufficient to meet all claims in full. The owner's liability is
thereby "limited" to his interest in the vessel. See generally G. GILMoRE & C.
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 663-748 (1957).
" See, e.g., United States v. Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 374 F.2d 656 (4th
Cir. 1967) ; China Union Lines, Ltd. v. A. 0. Andersen & Co., 364 F.2d 769 (5th
Cir. 1966); ln re Highland Navigation Corp., 24 F.2d 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1927).
"See Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 116-22 (1871); New
Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 434-37
(1848); The Rebecca, 20 F. Cas. 373, 375-76 (No. 11,619) (D. Me. 1831); H.
BAER, ADMIRALTY LAw OF THE SUPREME COURT 230 (2d ed. 1969); G. GILMoRE
& C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 663-67 (1957).

"9 Stat. 635 (1851), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1964).

""Freight" for purposes of limitation of liability is defined generally as the
earnings of the ship during a particular voyage. See, e.g., La Bourgogne, 210 U.S.
95, 136 (1908); lit re Baracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228, 232-3,3 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (the Torrey Canyon litigation).
'See Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943); La Bourgogne, 210 U.S. 95
(1908); Providence & N.Y.S.S. Co. v. Hicks Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883); The
concept of "privity" is amorphous, and the courts' applications defy definition.
However, where the owner has exercised due care in fitting out the vessel and has
no knowledge of any defects, there has been a reluctance on the part of the courts
to find privity. See, e.g., In re Canadian Pac. Ry., 278 F. 180 (D. Wash. 1921).
But beyond the clear lack of privity, the course of the decisions is hard to define.
See, e.g., States S.S. Co. v. United States, 259 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1957); The
Severance, 152 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1945); Oregon v. Tug Go-Getter, 299 F. Supp.
269 (D. Ore. 1969).
0"46 U.S.C. § 183 (1964).
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Limitation under the statute and the privilege of abandonment under the
general maritime law are closely related. They are, in fact, merely alternative forms of invoking the general limitation privilege found in the
maritime law. 9
Since a shipowner now faces the possibility of liability under Wyandotte for a sinking caused by neligence, the privileges in the Limitation
Act become significaint. An essential question that the Court in Wyandotte did not answer is whether removal-liability for the owner is to be
limited to those cases in which he himself is negligent, or is it to be
extended to include cases of negligence by a master or pilot?100 Only in
the context of the latter alternative will the question of limitation arise
since under no circumstances does the Limitation Act allow the privilege
to a negligent owner.
It seems unlikely, at least in view of the law as it has developed
in the field of agency, that an interpretation of the Court's decision should
be adopted that would restrict removal-liability to occasions when the
owner is personally at fault. 10 1 In fact, the exceptions of privity and
knowledge in the Limitation Act were included precisely because of the
principal-agent relationship existing between an owner and his master
or pilot.' 2 Negligence in the area of removal-liability certainly should
not alter that relationship.
Another problem is whether removal expenses incurred by the government are includable among those liabilities that can be limited under the
Limitation Act. There is little case law on the application of limitation of
9

See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 208-09
(1967); The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24, 29 (1881); Newark v. Mills, 35 F.2d 110,
113 (3d Cir. 1929); In re Highlands Navigation Corp., 29 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir.
1928).
100 1n re Midland Enterprises, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 13'56, 1364-65 (S.D. Ohio
1968).
201 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 216 (1957).
The common law, as well as the civil law, holds the owners responsible
for all the obligations of the master, contracted within the scope of his
authority as master, to their full extent, whether they result from contract or
tort. But, by the general maritime law of Europe, their responsibility for
his obligations, arising out of his wrongful acts, is limited to the amount
of their interest in the ship and freight. By abandoning these they exempt
themselves from all personal liability.... [I]n this state, by statute in conformity with the principles of the general maritime law, their liability is
restricted to their interest in the ship and freight.
Stinson v. Wyman, 23 F. Cas. 108, 109 (No. 13,460) (D. Me. 1841).
..See, e.g., Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 109-10 (1871);
New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 435
(1848).
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liability for removal expenses. This gap is due mainly to the absence of
any real need to claim limitation under pre-Wyandotte decisions. 10 3 But
there are some cases that have considered various aspects of the problem.
In the Stonedale No. 1,104 the House of Lords presented the general
English view, which refuses limitation for removal expenses when such
recovery is granted by statute. 0 5 The court reasoned that limitation
covers only physical damages caused by the sinking and that recovery
for removal expenses is not recovery for physical damages, but rather for
a debt raised by statute. However, the court said that limitation could be
maintained if the liability stemmed from an independent action on negligence and not from a statute.
An implication that may be drawn from the English decisions dealing
with statutory recovery is that limitation of liability in cases of removal
expenses may become a question of proximate cause; i.e., limitation was
not intended to apply to those damages incurred indirectly from the loss
of the vessel. This proposition is supported by a 1931 American case. In
The Snug Harbor, 8 damages from a collision with the unmarked wreck
thirty days after the vessel went down were held not subject to limitation. 0 7 The court concluded that "limitation of liability is limited to
limitation for disasters occurring on a particular voyage . . . and for
such loss or damage as occurs on the last voyage ... or on the voyage

on which the vessel is lost."' 0 8
But liability for a collision caused by failure to mark a wreck can
readily be distinguished from the liability arising out of removal costs.
The former is due to a subsequent negligent omission, whereas the latter
arises as a direct result of the initial loss. Moreover, the court that
decided The Snug Harbor only four years later found removal expenses
incurred under state law subject to limitation. In The Central States,109
limitation was allowed for the costs of removing the defendant's vessel from
the Erie Canal. The removal charge was based on state law. Holding the
Limitation Act applicable, the district court reasoned that the federal law
allowing limitation took precedence over the state law allowing recovery
" 3 See In re Midland Enterprises, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 1356, 1364-65 (S.D. Ohio
1968). But see Wong v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 230 (D. Hawaii
1958); The Central States, 9 F. Supp. 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1935).
[1955] 2 All E.R. 689 (H.L.). 972 (1939).
1o5See,
e.g., The Millie, 55 T.L.R.
53 F.2d 407 (E.D.N.Y. 1931).
108 Id. at 412.
100

107

Id.

1009

F. Supp. 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1935).
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for removal expenses."' If the case is taken as authority, the question
is then not whether removal expenses in general are a proper subject of
limitation of liability, but whether the Rivers and Harbors Act in some
way precludes limitation when removal is exercised under its provisions.
The question may turn on how well the Act can be subjected to limitation
and at the same time fulfill the expectations as outlined in Republic Steel
and Wyandotte.

This distinction has so far lain dormant beneath the Wyandotte
decision. Moreover, the question may have already been resolved. Since
the abandonment privilege, as pointed out previously, stemmed from the
same maritime tradition that gave birth to the Limitation Act, it must
be asked whether the Court, while abolishing the abandonment privilege
(formerly held to be included under section 15 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act),"' would still allow the spirit of Wyandotte to be thwarted by the

same principle dressed in the cloak of the Limitation Act. Rejection of
the abandonment privilege in Wyandotte could be viewed as a rejection
of the privilege of limitation of liability altogether in the field of removal
liability.
The attitude of the courts in recent years has not been entirely favorable
toward the limitation privilege of shipowners." 2 It has been labeled
1o 9 F. Supp. at 936. Accord, Hagan v. Richmond, 104 Va. 723, 52 S.E. 385
(1905). In Wong v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 230 (D. Hawaii

(1958), limitation was not allowed on other grounds, and the substantive issue
was never reached as to the proper inclusion of removal expenses in limitation
petitions.
"' See, e.g., United States v. Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 374 F.2d 656 (4th
Cir. 1967); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 319 F.2d 512, 518-19 (9th
Cir. 1963); The South Shore, 35 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1929); The Nassau, 29
F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1928).
Mr. Justice Fortas in Wyandotte, while noting that the two privileges are very
much alike, rejected at least the interpretation that Congress intended to give
statutory sanction to limitation of removal costs under the Rivers and Harbors
Act.
Petitioners also claim that a substantial body of non-statutory law establishes
the rule that a shipowner who has negligently sunk a vessel may abandon
it and be insulated from all but in rent liability. They argue that Congress
must have intended to codify this rule in the Rivers and Harbors Act.
We do not accept petitioner's claim .

.

. We do not believe Congress in-

tended the Rivers and Harbors Act to embody this illusory non-statutory
law.
389 U.S. at 208-09.
2
..
See Comment, Shipowners' Limited Liability, supra note 13, at 107-08.
For an overview of the changing concepts of the Supreme Court in the maritime
field, see generally Mendelsohn, Public Interest and PrivateInternationalMaritine
Law, 10 WM. & MARY L. REv. 783 (1969); Comment, High Tide: Public Policy
Decisions in Admiralty Law, 49 Oi. L. Rav. 76 (1969).
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as a subsidy of the shipping industry supported by those suffering
the actual injury." 3 This attitude has also been reflected in decisions
holding the shipowner liable either by stretching the concept of privity
or by expanding the concept of negligence." 4 Recognition of such trends
becomes important when predictions about the future course of the Court
are being made.
The first case to consider the problem since Wyandotte illustrates
the uncertainties that have resulted in the application of limitation of
liability to removal expenses. In In re Midland Enterprises,Inc.,115 barges
owned by the defendant collided with portions of the Markland Dam on
the Ohio River. Some of the barges sank and obstructed the river and
locks of the dam. Removal was accomplished by the government at a cost
of 240,000 dollars. The owners petitioned for limitation of their liability
in response to the government's claim for recovery of removal costs.
Although the court considered the implications of limitation of liability
as applied to removal expenses, the question remained unsettled since the
court declined to decide the issue until in personam liability for negligence
had been determined at trial."' The decision on the merits was not available at the time of this writing.
But the discussion in the court's opinion is valuable in that it illustrates
the judicial dilemma now faced in respect to liability for removal. Even
though the court admitted that Wyandotte had not answered all crucial
questions concerning limitation, it was able to reach one important conclusion. The court rejected the contentions that the liability for removal
expenses stemmed from events occuring after the voyage and that for
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1953).
"' See, e.g., States S.S. Co. v. United States, 259 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1957) ; In
re Republic of France, 171 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Tex. 1959), rev'd on other grounds,
290 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 804 (1962); The Linseed King, 24 F.2d 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1928), aff'd sub nom. It re Spencer Kellogg
& Sons, Inc., 52 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1931), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.,
Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Hicks, 285 U.S. 502 (1932). But see Coryell v.
Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943).
In 1957 the Tenth Conference on Private Maritime Law saw the adoption
of the International Convention on the Limitation of Shipowners' Liability (The
Brussells Limitation Convention of 1957). Article 1 (1) (c) of that convention would
allow removal liability to be included as a proper claim subject to limitation. See
H. BAER, AminIRALTY LAw OF THE SUPREME CoURT 562 (2d ed. 1969). Despite
support from the shipping industry, the convention was not signed by the United
States and is not law. Id. at 231 n.5; Comment, Shipowners' Limited Liability,
supra note 13, at 109.
11 296 F. Supp. 1356 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
Id. at 1366.
'11
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this reason there was no proper claim for limitation."' 7 It is the general
rule that claims arising after the termination of a voyage cannot be a
subject of the limitation proceeding because to make them so would allow
the owner to incur new liabilities without personal loss while at the same
time diminishing the limitation fund for prior claimants1 s The court in
The Snug Harbor relied on the rule to deny limitation to the claim for a
collision occurring thirty days after the sinking.119 The reason for the
rule, however, does not present itself in removal cases even if removal
claims could be held to stem from events occurring after the voyage
terminated. 2 ' But the court in Midland found that removal expenses
were products of events occurring while the vessels were "en voyage,"
and therefore, limitation could not be denied for that reason.' 21 If, as
Midland indicates, removal expenses are claims arising during the last
voyage, there would seem to be no barrier other than the implications of
Wyandotte standing between the Rivers and Harbors Act and the Limitation of Liability Act.
V.

CONCLUSION

Whether subsequent cases under Wyandotte 2 2 will shed more light
on the problem of limitation of liability can only be speculated upon.
But the course of the Supreme Court in Republic Steel and Wyandotte
is clear. The momentum of these two decisions as applied to obstructions in navigable waters must be given proper respect not only for what
they have changed, but for what they portend for the future. Viewed in
the context of' the modern problems facing the country's waterways, the
decisive language of each indicates that the Supreme Court would be
loath to make future decisions that would dampen the revived spirit of
the Rivers and Harbors Act.
THOMAS B. ANDERSON, JR.
1 7
2

Id. at 1365.

"'The Pelotas, 21 F.2d 236 (E.D. La. 1927). See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 74148 (1957).
'
53 F.2d 407, 412 (E.D.N.Y. 1931). See text at note 106 s'upra.
12See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, TE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 747-48 (1957).
F. Supp. at 1365.
Another case involving a chlorine barge, this one sunk near Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, during hurricane Betsy in 1965, is in the trial stage at this writing. ln re
12 296
122

Marine Leasing Serv., Inc., No. 869 (E.D. La. filed - 1968).

